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Cops for Hir e: Refor ming Regulation of Pr ivate
Police in Washington State
By Andrew Stokes
I. INTRODUCTION
In late 2015, some residents of Seattle, Washington believed their
neighborhoods were experiencing a crime epidemic.1 The Seattle Police
Department was seen as slow to respond to some crimes, including property
crimes and drug use.2 In response, residents pooled their resources to hire
private police3 to patrol their neighborhoods.4 The private police were seen
as providing improved response times and more aggressive tactics: one
group of residents in the Magnolia neighborhood claimed that “[t]he
[public] police are not allowed to speak to anyone unless they have a
reasonable suspicion that a crime may be afoot. Further, they must be able
1
See Erica C. Barnett, Magnolia Resident Pepper-Sprayed by Private Security Guard,
THE C IS FOR CRANK (Mar. 4, 2016), https://thecisforcrank.com/2016/03/04/magnoliaresident-pepper-sprayed-by-private-security-guard/ [https://perma.cc/F27N-BEBS].
2
See, e.g., David Kroman, Pepper-spraying in Magnolia puts private cops in the
spotlight, CROSSCUT (Mar. 8, 2016), http://crosscut.com/2016/03/pepper-spraying-inmagnolia-puts-private-cops-in-the-spotlight/ [https://perma.cc/KM7U-BVZ3]; Jessica
Lee, Seattle neighborhoods hire private security amid ‘blatant lawlessness’, SEATTLE
TIMES (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/citizen-anti-crimemovement-afoot-in-seattles-neighborhoods/ [https://perma.cc/HU54-GTPN].
3
By “private police” I refer to lawful, private, for-profit services whose primary
objectives include preventing crime, protecting property and life, and maintaining order.
See Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
49, 55 (2004). While private police have similarities with other private security
organizations, they are distinct from vigilante groups (vigilante actions are illegal; private
police are authorized by law) and private military organizations (military organizations
focus on operations abroad; private police are focused on domestic policing). See id. at
56. Because they are hired by a private actor, private police are distinct from private
firms hired by a public police department to accomplish a traditional government
function. See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Outsourcing Criminal Prosecution?: The Limits
of Criminal Justice Privatization, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 265, 269–70 (2010).
4
Lee, supra note 2.
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to articulate this suspicion in clear language. Private [police] can interact
with anyone at any time. Because they do not represent the Government and
the Constitution does not apply to private [police].”5
While this characterization of the restrictions on public police is not
entirely accurate, the claim nonetheless contains important insights. If an
individual or group thinks that their local police department does not
respond quickly enough to emergency calls or does not patrol the
neighborhood often enough, they can simply hire private police to fill in the
gaps. Furthermore, unlike public police, whose conduct is governed by state
and federal constitutions and rules of criminal procedure, the private police
are not typically regulated by state and federal constitutions because they
are not considered state actors.6 Rather, the private police “find their
conduct governed by a hodgepodge of private contract provisions, state and
local regulations, and tort and criminal law doctrines.”7
However, recent events show that these regulations are not adequate to
protect the public from abuses by the private police. In December 2015,
residents of the Magnolia neighborhood hired the firm Central Protection
(CP) to patrol their neighborhood.8 The CP vehicles proclaimed that they
were “Unarmed” and CP had ostensibly been instructed that, if they
observed “suspicious activity,” they were to immediately “contact 911, and
maintain visual surveillance of the perpetrator until Seattle Police arrive at
the scene.”9

5

Private Security Officers vs Public Law Enforcement, MAGNOLIA PATROL
ASSOCIATION
(Dec.
14,
2015),
https://web.archive.org/web/20160304231831/http://www.magnoliapatrol.org/blog/
[https://perma.cc/A7Z4-BU48].
6
See Joh, supra note 3, at 95.
7
David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1166–67 (1999).
8
MAGNOLIA
PATROL
ASSOCIATION,
https://web.archive.org/web/20160208203841/http://www.magnoliapatrol.org/
[httpa://perma.cc/HU24-7TCU] (last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
9
Id.
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Less than three months later, a longtime neighborhood resident who had
recently lost his home10 was sitting in his car before his shift at a local gas
station.11 A blue-and-white CP Hummer pulled up behind him.12 “Within
the next five minutes or so, the officer had pepper-sprayed [the resident] in
the face and, reportedly, knocked [his] Android phone out of his hand,
sending the phone’s face, body, and battery scattering in different
directions.”13
The officer had reportedly been accused of aggressive behavior a year
earlier,14 had been convicted of negligent driving and unlawful discharge of
a firearm, and had pleaded guilty to one gross misdemeanor count of
violating a no-contact order and one felony count of forgery.15 In 2010, his
felony conviction was vacated on the grounds that it was affecting his
opportunities to obtain licensing for employment, and in 2011 the court
restored his right to own a gun.16 In 2013, he received his license to work as
a private security guard.17 In 2014, while employed by a different private
police company, he was arrested and charged with two counts of fourthdegree assault after pepper spraying two teenagers.18

10
Gabriel Spitzer, Pepper Spray Skirmish Shakes Homeless Magnolia Resident’s Faith
in His Neighborhood, KNKX 88.5FM (Jun. 11, 2016), http://knkx.org/post/pepper-sprayskirmish-shakes-homeless-magnolia-resident-s-faith-his-neighborhood
[httpa://perma.cc/9AHV-QH9N].
11
Barnett, supra note 1.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Kroman, supra note 2.
15
Erica C. Barnett, Magnolia Guard Accused in Pepper-Spray Incident Pled Guilty to
Felony; SPD Says He May Have Overstepped His Authority, THE C IS FOR CRANK (Mar.
7, 2016), https://thecisforcrank.com/2016/03/07/magnolia-guard-accused-in-pepperspray-incident-pled-guilty-to-felony-spd-says-he-may-have-overstepped-his-authority/
[https://perma.cc/R9CL-VZEE].
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Alison Grande, Magnolia security guard previously charged with assault, KIRO 7
(Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.kiro7.com/news/magnolia-security-guard-previouslycharged-with-assault/151435065[https://perma.cc/2Z45-KYDS].
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This incident was not the only example of inappropriate private police
behavior in Seattle. In August 2014, a black man was walking near the
Westlake Center mall in downtown Seattle when a person described in legal
documents as “Shirtless White Man” accosted him.19 A private police
officer, who was providing security guard services for the mall, arrived on
the scene; rather than confronting “Shirtless White Man,” the officer
pepper-sprayed the black pedestrian in the face.20 The officer reportedly
then detained the pedestrian, in the process tearing ligaments in the
pedestrian’s wrist, and prohibited him from washing the pepper spray out of
his eyes.21
These stories demonstrate that the lack of regulation surrounding the
private police in Washington creates a significant risk to the public. The
Washington State Legislature should improve the regulation of private
police companies in order to ensure that private police do not infringe on
the rights of Washington residents. Specifically, the legislature should enact
legislation to (1) modify the existing regulatory regime to cover all private
police in Washington while allowing local flexibility to implement
supplemental regulations, (2) improve transparency into the private police
industry, (3) require more thorough training for private police, and (4) make
it easier for people harmed by the private police to receive redress.
This article will begin by discussing the scope of the private police
industry, both nationally and within Washington, and identifying some of
the risks posed by that industry. It will then outline the existing regulatory
framework for the private police, with a focus on Washington’s statutory
and case law addressing the private police. The article will proceed to
identify a series of reforms that should be enacted to improve the regulation

19

Ansel Herz, What We Know About Use of Force by Mall Cops, THE STRANGER (Nov.
26, 2014), https://www.thestranger.com/seattle/what-we-know-about-use-of-force-bymall-cops/Content?oid=21093635 [https://perma.cc/KBC6-8ASA].
20
Id.
21
Id.
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of the private police industry in Washington. The article will conclude by
addressing potential critiques of the reforms proposed.

II. BACKGROUND: THE GROWTH OF THE PRIVATE POLICE INDUSTRY
AND THE RISKS IT POSES
This section will discuss the scope of the private police industry. First, it
will outline the size of the industry and the types of activities it undertakes.
Second, it will identify some of the problems posed by the private police.
These problems include private officers’ power to exercise coercive
pressures against members of the public, particularly the most vulnerable;
the strong incentives discouraging the private police from enforcing the
criminal law; and the potential of the private police to undermine efforts to
reform the public police. Third, this section will discuss why people hire the
private police.
A. Who Are the Private Police
Private police provide a variety of services to their clients. They may be
hired as security guards or bodyguards.22 They may be hired to patrol
neighborhoods and gated communities.23 Private police clients may include
owners of “mass private property” that is accessible to the public, such as
housing complexes, college campuses, or shopping malls.24 Other
businesses, such as nightclubs25 and retail establishments,26 may hire private
police to maintain order or deter criminal activity.
Private police have a substantial presence in the United States. According
to some observers, there are roughly three private police officers for every
22

Amitai Etzioni, Reining in Private Agents, 101 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 279, 294
(2016).
23
Id. at 299.
24
Id.
25
See, e.g., State v. Chavez, No. 299619, 2013 WL 868201, 4 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 7,
2013) [https://perma.cc/XJ2H-2KCV].
26
See, e.g., State v. Davis, No. 75234-1-I, 2016 WL 3982944, at *3–4 (Wash. Ct. App.
July 25, 2016) [https://perma.cc/2X9R-GZPR].
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public police officer in the U.S.27 Recent estimates show 2.7 million private
police serving in the U.S. as of 2014.28 The amount of money spent on
private policing is double that spent on public policing.29 The growth of
private policing is a global trend, and has been very profitable.30 In the U.S.,
private security services are a $282 billion industry.31
Washington follows this trend; the state has approximately 11,000
licensed private police,32 compared to 11,411 sworn public police officers.33
The city of Sequim, WA, has privatized its prosecutorial function.34
Some private police are employed by companies dedicated to providing
private police services, others are employed by other types of companies. In
the past, most private police were employed directly by the business they
serve; more recently, the number of officers employed by companies
dedicated to private policing has grown.35 Sixty-one percent of private
police are employed by a company dedicated to providing private police
services.36 However, despite their prominence, private police officers have
no more legal authority than an ordinary citizen to make stops, searches, or
arrests.37
27

Karena Rahall, The Siren is Calling: Economic and Ideological Trends Toward
Privatization of Public Police Forces, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 633, 647 (2014).
28
Etzioni, supra note 22, at 295.
29
Joh, supra note 3, at 55.
30
See Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and
Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879 (2004).
31
See Etzioni, supra note 22, at 295 (this measure includes spending on IT security, and
thus does not perfectly capture the size of the private police industry).
32
Herz, supra note 19. Washington’s regulations refer to “private security guards” rather
than “private police.” See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 18.170.010–18.170.902 (1995). For the
sake of clarity, this article will use “private police” where possible.
33
Brian A. Reaves, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 15 (2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M82X-XBSE] (includes both state and local personnel).
34
Fairfax, supra note 3, at 281.
35
Stephen Rushin, The Regulation of Private Police, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 159, 168–69
(2012).
36
Id. at 167.
37
Heidi Boghosian, Applying Restraints to Private Police, 70 MO. L. REV. 177, 186
(2005).
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B. Problems with Private Police
The private police create several risks for people in communities where
they are present. This section will identify three primary challenges posed
by the private police: first, despite their lack of legal authority, private
police are able to exert significant coercive pressures over other people;
second, private police have strong incentives to serve their clients at the
expense of the general public; and third, private police threaten to
undermine efforts to reform the public police.
1. Pr ivate Police Exer cise Coer cive Pr essur es over Civilians
While the private police have no more legal authority than an ordinary
person, the work of a private police officer “routinely includes . . . depriving
individuals of their freedom.”38 Their uniforms are designed to mimic those
of public police and they are trained to behave like public police officers.39
Though they have no official legal status, their dress and demeanor imply
that they act with state authority.40 Unlike most people, private police
officers are familiar with the rules of criminal procedure and can use them
to their advantage.41 They can also employ private drug-sniffing dogs.42
Private police officers regularly detain people, conduct searches, investigate
crimes, maintain order, safeguard property, and conduct surveillance.43
They also seize evidence, conduct pat-downs, question suspected persons,
and arrest people.44 They are able to exercise significant coercive pressures
over other people.45
38
Sean James Beaton, Counterparts in Modern Policing: The Influence of Corporate
Investigators on the Public Police and a Call for the Broadening of the State Action
Doctrine, 26 TOURO L. REV. 593, 595 (2010).
39
Joh, supra note 3, at 112.
40
Boghosian, supra note 37, at 186.
41
Joh, supra note 3, at 112.
42
See Jeremiah K. Geffe, License to Sniff: The Need to Regulate Privately Owned DrugSniffing Dogs, 19 J. OF GENDER, RACE AND JUST. 167, 168 (2016).
43
Rushin, supra note 35, at 182; Beaton, supra note 38 at 595; Joh, supra note 3, at 50.
44
Joh, supra note 3, at 88–89.
45
Id. at 64–66.
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Their lack of legal status itself facilitates their ability to coerce others;
unlike public police, private police are not required to provide Miranda
warnings, and any evidence they obtain is not subject to the exclusionary
rule.46 Private police are largely free to search people without cause, detain
them, question them without providing Miranda warnings, and then turn
them over to the public police, along with any evidence found.47 If the
public police were to conduct a search or seizure that violated the Fourth
Amendment, any evidence seized may be subject to suppression.48
However, evidence seized by the private police is not subject to the
exclusionary rule.49 This enables them to use interrogations as a
“mechanism of social control.”50
However, private police training is insufficient to prepare them to interact
safely with the public. The law requires private police to undergo only
minimal training,51 and because turnover in the industry is high, companies
typically cannot afford to spend significant resources training every new
employee.52 While Washington law requires private police to undergo
additional training to carry a gun, no such requirement applies to private
police who carry Tasers or pepper spray.53 Anecdotal evidence suggests that
private police receive little to no training regarding working with homeless
populations and that this lack of training results in violence.54

46

Rushin, supra note 35, at 182.
See infra Part III.A. (explaining why private police are not required to provide
Miranda warnings.)
48
See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
49
See, e.g., State v. Chavez, No. 299619, 2013 WL 868201, 4 (Wash. App. Mar. 7,
2013).
50
Rushin, supra note 35, at 182.
51
See infra Part IV.C. (explaining the inadequacy of Washington’s private police
training standards.)
52
See Boghosian, supra note 37, at 1279.
53
See WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.130(2) (1995).
54
See Evan Allen & Nicole Dungca, TD Garden Cuts Ties with Firm Accused of
Beatings,
BOSTON
GLOBE
(Jan.
26,
2017),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/01/25/garden-severs-ties-with-firm-accused47
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In contrast, public police are typically required to undergo much more
extensive training;55 in Washington this consists of 720 hours of basic
training.56 This training is associated with increased professionalism among
public police forces.57
2. Pr ivate Police Have Str ong Incentives to Ser ve Their Clients Rather
than Enfor cing the Law
Private police have strong incentives discouraging them from reporting
criminal activity to the police, assisting with prosecution, or otherwise
helping enforce the criminal law.58 If private police encounter criminal
activity, they have powerful incentives to simply push that behavior away
from their client’s property, rather than calling the public police.59 First,
reporting the crime to the public police may require the private police to
detain suspects, make statements, and testify in any future trial, all of which
could lead to higher costs to the customer.60 Second, some clients may
instruct the private police not to pursue a criminal conviction due to a belief
that the public criminal justice system is too punitive, too lenient, or
otherwise ineffective.61 Third, even if the client instructs private police to
report suspicious activity and aid in prosecution, officers may have an
incentive to under-report crime in order to meet contractual or performance

homeless-beatings/6g9d1CbJ1QlKZWlLTxOZSN/story.html
[https://perma.cc/Z92GHD8E].
55
See Rushin, supra note 35, at 197; Joh, supra note 3, at 191–92.
56
WASH. ST. CRIM. JUST. TRAINING COMMISSION: LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY,
https://fortress.wa.gov/cjtc/www/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15&
Itemid=103 [https://perma.cc/6N9Y-LP9Y] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017). Private police are
required to undergo only 16 hours of training and four hours of annual refresher training.
WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.105 (2007).
57
Rushin, supra note 35, at 191.
58
See Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 925
(2007).
59
See id.
60
Id. at 937–38.
61
See, e.g., id. at 924–47.

VOLUME 16 • ISSUE 2 • 2017

569

570 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

objectives.62 Fourth, private police have a profit motive to avoid enforcing
the criminal law: by pushing criminal activity away, private police can
increase the demand for their services in any areas that see a resulting spike
in crime.63 Private police advertising has attempted to fuel fears about crime
in order to boost demand for their services.64 Fifth, even if the private police
were otherwise inclined to report criminal activity, the risk of losing
business creates an overwhelming incentive not to report crimes when they
are committed by clients.65 Thus, private police who encounter criminal
activity have a strong incentive to simply push the activity away from their
customer’s property rather than attempting to prevent its occurrence.
The mandate to serve the customer comes at a cost to the public. If
private police are paid, not to stop criminal activity, but simply to move it
away from their clients’ property, those areas that are not privately policed
may bear the burden of increased criminal activity. The impact will be felt
most heavily in economically disadvantaged areas whose residents are
unable to afford the services of private police.66
Empirical evidence supports the notion that the private police do not
consistently turn criminal suspects over to the public police for
prosecution.67 Indeed, a Facebook page purportedly belonging to the private
police officer reportedly involved in the Westlake Mall incident featured a
post saying, “I’m not going to ‘arrest’ you, I am just going to throw your ass
on the ground, handcuff you, drag you through the mall to the Security
Office with the help of my uniformed buddies… Screw arresting! Detaining
is way more fun! :D.”68

62

See Rahall, supra note 27, at 666.
Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1224.
64
Id. at 1223.
65
See Fairfax, supra note 3, at 285–86.
66
See Etzioni, supra note 22, at 299 (noting that use of private police services is higher
in areas marked by economic inequality).
67
See Simmons, supra note 58, at 938–39.
68
Herz, supra note 19.
63
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3. Pr ivate Police Under mine Effor ts to Regulate the Public Police
The ease with which people can hire private police to undertake activities
that the public police cannot or will not has significant implications for
efforts to regulate the conduct of the public police. Because public police
are subject to institutional controls, such as oversight from elected officials
or a desire to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the public, they have
incentives to cooperate with efforts to reform their conduct.69 No similar
concerns govern the conduct of the private police; they report only to their
clients.70
The lax regulation of the private police may render ineffective reforms
designed to curb abusive public police conduct and may undermine the
legitimacy of the public police. Regulations that apply to the public police
only rarely apply to the private police.71 This regulatory discrepancy creates
an incentive for private police to undertake activities that public police are
prohibited from undertaking.72 A jurisdiction that enacts reforms to prevent
public police from using excessive force or engaging in racial profiling
cannot be confident that those practices will be eliminated; they may simply
shift from public to private police. Public police in such a jurisdiction can
still take advantage of the prohibited tactics: they can simply wait for the
private police to act and then take advantage of any evidence obtained.73
Even if the public police do not take advantage of this opportunity, the
similarity between public and private police uniforms74 may cause the
69
See Simmons, supra note 58, at 926–27. See also Etzioni, supra note 22, at 296–97
(other institutional constraints on the public police include: internal affairs units, civilian
review boards, independent state- or local-level commissions, and Department of Justice
oversight; while these institutions do not eliminate all public police abuses, similar
restrictions are completely absent from the private police).
70
Rushin, supra note 35, at 176.
71
See infra Part III.A (explaining that the provisions of law that govern public police—
including the Constitution and rules of criminal procedure—do not generally govern the
conduct of private police).
72
See Joh, supra note 3, at 116.
73
Id. at 115–16.
74
Boghosian, supra note 37, at 181.
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public to believe that the public police are still engaged in prohibited
behavior.
Concern about the effect private police have on public police reform is
particularly salient in Washington. In 2011, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) identified a pattern or practice of unconstitutional use of force by the
Seattle Police Department (SPD).75 In response, the City and DOJ entered
into a “consent decree” in order to reform the SPD and reduce improper use
of force by public police.76 While the reform efforts have made significant
progress, there are still instances of excessive use of force, and it is unclear
whether the reforms have eliminated discriminatory policing practices.77
Lax regulation of the private police creates the risk that public police will
circumvent the new regulations or that the public will distrust the public
police reforms.
C. Why Do the Private Police Exist
Most observers attribute the growth of the private police industry to the
perception that the public police are unable or unwilling to provide the
types of policing services that civilians desire.78 In recent years, city and
state budgets have declined, and those governments have been unable to
maintain the level of public police funding that some people expect.79
Reductions in funding may decrease the frequency of public police patrols
or reduce their response times, especially to non-emergency situations. A
75

Ninth Systemic Assessment: Use of Force, SEATTLE POLICE MONITOR 1 (April 2017)
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5425b9f0e4b0d66352331e0e/t/58e6a753ff7c50ebba
d126f8/1491511130661/Ninth+Systemic+Assessment--Use+of+Force--FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9DC6-WCEY].
76
Id.
77
See id. at 9–10.
78
See, e.g., Cooper J. Strickland, Regulation Without Agency: A Practical Response to
Private Policing in United States v. Day, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1338, 1338 (2011); Fairfax,
supra note 3, at 274; Joh, supra note 3, at 67–68; Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1194; see
also, id. at 1221–24 (rebutting alternative explanations of the growth of the private police
industry).
79
Rahall, supra note 27, at 659–60.
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belief that the public police are not doing an adequate job of preventing
crime will create a gap that private police firms will be eager to fill.80
Indeed, Seattle residents have cited increased drug and property crime,
inadequate response times to 911 calls, and infrequent public police patrols
as justifications for hiring private police.81
The availability of private police creates a disincentive for richer
neighborhoods to invest in public police funding. People with the resources
to hire private police may push for lower taxes, confident that the private
police can fulfill their policing needs.82 While this reduces the quality of
police services for the community as a whole, richer neighborhoods can
offset any decline by hiring private police.83 Indeed, studies have shown a
correlation between economic inequality and reliance on private police.84
Additionally, many people turn to the private police because of
dissatisfaction with how the public police operate. Someone who believes
that the public criminal justice system is unduly punitive and ineffective
may hire private police and instruct them to work to rehabilitate offenders
or integrate them into the community, rather than turning them over to the
public police.85 However, some of the demand for private police has been
driven by a desire to keep homeless people or people of color out of certain
residential areas.86 Unlike the public police, who may be barred by law from
undertaking such activities, the private police operate under a much less
restrictive regulatory framework.87 Studies have suggested that perceptions

80

Id. at 671.
See Lee, supra note 2.
82
Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1283–84.
83
Id.
84
See Etzioni, supra note 22, at 299.
85
See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 57, at 913–17.
86
Etzioni, supra note 22, at 299; Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1224 –25.
87
See infra Part III (explaining the lax regulatory framework governing the private
police).
81
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of a “racial threat” explain the presence of private police better than high
crime rates.88

III. EXISTING REGULATORY STRUCTURES ARE INADEQUATE TO
PROTECT THE PUBLIC FROM ABUSES BY THE PRIVATE POLICE
This section will address the current legal frameworks governing the
conduct of the private police. It will begin by reviewing the federal legal
scheme with a focus on whether private police are subject to the
constitutional provisions that govern the public police. It will then discuss
Washington State regulations on the private police, focusing on the extent
to which Washington courts have considered the private police subject to
constitutional constraints and the statutory licensing scheme that serves as
the primary body of law governing the private police in Washington.
A. Federal Regulations on the Conduct of the Private Police Are Virtually
Non-Existent
The federal legal authorities governing the conduct of the public police
do not apply to the private police because they are not considered state
actors. Generally, public police conduct is regulated by civil rights laws
such as § 1983,89 the Fourth,90 Fifth,91 Sixth,92 and Fourteenth93
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the exclusionary rule,94 and the

88

Etzioni, supra note 22, at 299.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes a civil suit against any person who “under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage” deprives another person of “any rights,
privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”
90
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures).
91
U.S. CONST. amend. V (protection against self-incrimination; due process).
92
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (right to speedy and public trials; right to confront witnesses;
right to counsel).
93
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (extending the Bill of Rights to the states; guarantee of due
process).
94
“[A]ll evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is,
by that same authority, inadmissible in state court.” Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961) (extending rule that barred admission of such evidence in federal criminal trials).
89
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Miranda95 requirement. However, these regulations only apply to state
actors.96 When determining whether an entity is a state actor, a court
examines whether that entity relies on government assistance or benefits or
performs traditional governmental functions, as well as whether the injury
caused is uniquely aggravated by governmental authority.97 While some
legal scholars believe that, under these factors, the private police should be
considered state actors, courts have consistently refused to consider private
police as state actors, thus leaving them un-governed by the provisions of
law that generally govern the public police.98
The United States Supreme Court has twice addressed whether actors
similar to the private police can be considered state actors.99 However, in
both of those cases, the private actor was acting with some element of
official state authority: Williams v. United States concerned a private
detective who was certified as a special police officer and flashed his badge
while interrogating a suspect;100 Griffin v. Maryland addressed a private
security guard who had been deputized as a county sheriff, wore his
sheriff’s badge, and identified himself as a deputy sheriff.101 The Court later
clarified that these decisions do not govern private police, writing that
Griffin “sheds no light on the constitutional status of private police forces,
and we express no opinion here.”102 Lower courts are thus left with little
guidance as to how to resolve the constitutional status of the private
police.103
95
Requiring that a suspect be advised of her rights to remain silent and to have
assistance of counsel before a custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
478–79 (1966).
96
Joh, supra note 3, at 94.
97
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991).
98
Joh, supra note 3, at 95.
99
Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130
(1964).
100
Williams, 341 U.S. at 98–99.
101
Griffin, 378 U.S. at 132–35.
102
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163 n.14 (1978).
103
Joh, supra note 3, at 101; Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1236–39.
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The result is that lower federal and state courts have generally considered
private police to be private actors not subject to constitutional constraint.104
Courts have followed the Supreme Court’s focus on whether the state has
vested a private police officer with a formal title or authority.105 Incidental
state involvement in the actions of the private police is not sufficient to
convert them into state actors.106 Thus, the Constitution generally does not
govern the conduct of the private police; protections like the prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures, the exclusionary rule, and the
requirement for Miranda warnings are not applicable when a person
interacts with the private police.
There is very little federal legislation that directly addresses the private
police. The most notable federal statute that addresses the private police
prohibits the federal government and the government of the District of
Columbia from employing the Pinkerton police or a similar agency, but this
is rarely invoked.107
B. Washington State Law Does Not Adequately Regulate the Private Police
Washington law does not adequately govern the conduct of the private
police. This section will discuss three aspects of Washington law that touch
on the conduct of the private police. First, state courts do not consider the
private police to be state actors. Second, the Washington State
Constitution’s stronger protection against search and seizure only applies to
state actors. Third, Washington’s statutory licensing scheme for private
police is inadequate.

104

Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1239–44.
Id. at 1244–46.
106
Joh, supra note 3, at 92.
107
5 U.S.C. § 3108 (1966). See Joh, supra note 3, at 93.
105
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1. Washington Cour ts Do Not Consider the Pr ivate Police to be State
Actor s
Like to the United States Supreme Court, Washington courts do not
generally consider private police to be state actors; thus, they are not subject
to the constitutional rules that constrain the public police. While the United
States Supreme Court has not provided guidance as to when private police
should be considered state actors, state courts have discretion to conduct
their own state actor analyses.108 Lower Washington courts have
consistently found private actors, working without encouragement or
support from the state, to be non-state actors.109 One court noted that “it is
well established that private security guards are not transformed into state

108
Indeed, some have argued that the correct application of existing Supreme Court
precedent would require a finding that private police are state actors. See Joh, supra note
3, at 95.
109
See, e.g., State v. Davis, No. 75234-1-I, 2016 WL 3982944, at *3–4 (Wash. Ct. App.
July 25, 2016) (finding that a Wal-Mart loss prevention manager who questioned a
shoplifting suspect pursuant to company policy was not a state agent); State v. Garcia,
No. 59925-9-I, 2008 WL 2955881, at *4–5 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2008) (finding that a
bail recovery agent is not a state actor because he was not employed by the state and his
contractual authority to seize a particular fugitive was not legal authority to enforce
criminal law); Barbu v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 53494-7-I, 2004 WL 2526672, at *3 (Wash.
Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2004) (finding that Rite Aid security guards were not “transformed into
state actors” when they detained a suspected shoplifter and worked with responding
police officers to process the arrest paperwork); State v. Walter, 833 P.2d 440, 443
(Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (finding no state action when developer of photographic negatives
brought evidence of a crime to police); State v. Ludvik, 698 P.2d 1064, 1067-68 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1985) (finding that a state game agent who saw evidence of criminal activity
near his home and took no action other than reporting it to the police was not acting in his
official capacity and thus his report was not attributable to a state actor); State v.
Gonzales, 604 P.2d 168, 170 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (finding that a security guard, as a
private citizen, is not a state actor); State v. Sweet, 596 P.2d 1080, 1081–82 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1979) (finding that evidence obtained by airline employees who were not acting as
agents of, or in concert with, law enforcement authorities was not subject to the
exclusionary rule); State v. Agee, 522 P.2d 1084, 1087–88 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976)
(finding that the fact that a person had been a paid police informant in the past did not
convert him into a government actor).
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actors . . . merely because they detain and investigate shoplifters before
turning them over to the police.”110
While the Washington Supreme Court has only rarely addressed the
question of when actors like the private police are considered state actors,
an analysis of its decisions in this area suggest that it will only consider a
private police officer to be a state actor when the officer is vested with legal
authority to investigate violations of the criminal law and a reasonable
person would believe the actor possessed state authority.
State v. Heritage concerned two bicycle-mounted security officers in a
park in downtown Spokane.111 “Both officers wore shorts and white t-shirts
with an emblem of a badge emblazoned with the words ‘Security Officer.’
They also carried a ‘duty bag’ containing a radio, pepper spray, handcuffs,
and a collapsible baton.”112 They were employed by the city and their
responsibilities included patrolling for unlawful activities.113 They observed
several teenagers they suspected of smoking marijuana, approached them,
and questioned them without providing Miranda warnings.114 One teenager
admitted possession of a marijuana pipe, was convicted of possession of
drug paraphernalia, and appealed, arguing that the security officers were
state actors and that their questioning thus violated the Miranda rule.115 The
court found that the guards’ appearance, including a duty belt with
handcuffs and a t-shirt identifying them as park security, would have caused
a reasonable observer to believe they were acting with state authority.116
Because they were also employed by the city and were acting in their

110

Barbu v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 53494-7-I, 2004 WL 2526672, at *3 (Wash. App. Nov.
8, 2004).
111
State v. Heritage, 95 P.3d 345, 346 (Wash. 2004).
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 348.
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official capacity to investigate suspected criminal activity, the court
concluded that the officers were state actors.117
Another Washington Supreme Court case concerning a search by a
private actor clarified that the state and federal constitutions only regulate
searches by state actors. In State v. Eisfeldt, a repairman was called to a
home and, while completing the repairs, noticed what he believed to be
evidence of marijuana growing.118 He called the police and let them into the
home, where they also saw the evidence.119 At this point, the police stopped
their search and obtained a search warrant.120 When they executed the
warrant, they found evidence of an active marijuana-growing operation and
arrested the defendant.121 The defendant sought to suppress the evidence
obtained from the search, alleging that the initial, warrantless, search with
the repairman was a violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution and Article I, Section 7, of the Washington State
Constitution.122 While the court overturned the conviction, it did so based
on a finding that the initial, warrantless, police search of the home was a
violation of the Washington Constitution. 123 The court clarified that Article
I, Section 7, only regulates searches by state actors.124
Indeed, Eisfeldt has been interpreted narrowly. In State v. Chavez, the
court of appeals declined to grant a motion to exclude evidence obtained by
a private search.125 In that case, a security guard at a nightclub searched the
defendant when he entered the club and found cocaine.126 The defendant

117

Id.
State v. Eisfeldt, 185 P.3d 580, 583 (Wash. 2008).
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 587.
124
Id. at 585 (noting that “article I, section 7 provides greater protection from state action
than does the Fourth Amendment” (emphasis added)).
125
State v. Chavez, No. 299619, 2013 WL 868201, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2013).
126
Id. at *1
118
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was handcuffed and police were called.127 When the police arrived, the
nightclub staff turned over the cocaine and the defendant was arrested.128
The defendant attempted to suppress the cocaine, arguing that the private
search was analogous to the illegal search in Eisfeldt.129 The court
disagreed, noting that Eisfeldt’s conviction was overturned based on an
illegal search by the public police.130 In contrast, the cocaine in this case
was given to the police by the nightclub; the police did not actually search
the defendant.131 Since there was no warrantless search by a state actor,
there was no violation of Article 1, Section 7, of the Washington State
Constitution.132
A recent case further demonstrated that the Washington Supreme Court is
unlikely to consider a quasi-private actor to be a state actor.133 In State v.
K.L.B, the defendant was riding on Seattle’s Link light-rail system when a
Fare Enforcement Officer (FEO) requested proof of fare payment.134 The
FEOs are employed by a private police company, which has a contract to
provide fare enforcement services on the light-rail, but the FEOs are
empowered to issue citations for civil infractions, such as a failure to pay a
fare.135 They wear a uniform with patches saying “Sound Transit,”
“security,” and “fare enforcement,” and wear a tool belt with a radio and
handcuffs, but do not carry a weapon.136 When the defendant was unable to
provide a valid proof of fare payment, the FEO asked him for

127

Id.
Id.
129
See id. at *4.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
See State v. K.L.B., 328 P.3d 886, 887 (Wash. 2014) (considering whether private
actors were “public servants” under a statute that made it a crime to give a false or
misleading statement to a public servant).
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
128
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identification.137 The defendant gave the FEO a false name.138 Public police
were called, and when the defendant told them his true name, he was
charged with making a false or misleading statement to a public servant.139
The court vacated the charges on the ground that the FEOs were not public
officers.140 The court reasoned that even though the FEOs have limited
authority granted by statute, they are not “vested with some sovereign
power of government” and do not exercise the powers that ordinary public
police officers do.141 While this case addressed, not whether the private
police were state actors for constitutional purposes, but whether the private
police fit a statutory definition of a “public servant,” it suggests that the
court is unlikely to consider a private police officer working for a nongovernmental client as a state actor.142
In sum, the decisions by the Washington Supreme Court related to the
private police suggest that the court will only find someone to be a state
actor if the person is employed by the state, has authority to investigate and
enforce the criminal law, and dresses and acts in a way that would cause a
reasonable person to believe they act with state authority. A private police
137

Id.
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 891.
141
Id. at 890.
142
Cf. State v. Graham, 927 P.2d 227 (Wash. 1996) In Graham, two public police
officers were armed and wearing their uniforms, but were off-duty and working as private
security guards, when they saw a man carrying a large wad of money and what they
believed to be cocaine. Id. at 228–29. When they attempted to arrest him, he fled, and
when they caught him, he resisted arrest by flailing and kicking. Id. at 29. The defendant
was charged with obstructing a public servant but argued that because the officers were
working for a private company at the time of the arrest, they were not public servants. Id.
at 230. The Washington Supreme Court held that though they were working for a private
company, the officers were public servants at the time of the arrest because they “stepped
out of their roles as private security guards and into their roles as police officers.” Id. at
233. The court emphasized that the officers had introduced themselves as public police
and that the defendant knew that they were public police. Id. This decision provides
further evidence that, when drawing a line between public and private authority, the
Washington Supreme Court focuses on the presence or absence of formal legal authority
and the reasonable perception of state authority.
138
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officer who is not acting at the behest of the state is unlikely to be
considered a state actor. Thus, any evidence obtained by the private police
will be admissible at trial so long as the conduct of the public police
comports with the law.
2. Washington’s Constitution Does Not Gover n the Behavior of Pr ivate
Police
Though the state constitution provides greater protection than the federal
Constitution, it also does not apply to private actors. Article I, Section 7 of
the Washington State Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be
disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of
law.”143 While broadly analogous to the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, this provision has in some instances been interpreted as
providing greater protection.144 However, this provision has only been
applied to state actors, and thus does not restrict the activities of the private
police.145
3. Washington’s Statutor y Licensing Scheme for Pr ivate Police Is
Inadequate
The body of state law that most directly governs the private police are
licensing statutes, however, these regulations are not sufficient to protect
the public. Washington State governs the private police primarily through
licensing requirements for private police companies and officers; a person
must have a license from the state to work as a private police officer or
operate a private police company.146 However, the licensing requirements
143

WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
See, e.g., State v. Budd, 374 P.3d 137, 140 (Wash. 2016).
145
See State v. Eisfeldt, 185 P.3d 580, 585 (Wash. 2008).
146
See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 18.170.010–18.170.902. As noted earlier, the Washington
licensing requirements refer to “private security guards” rather than “private police.” For
the sake of clarity, this article will use “private police” where possible. Nationally, state
statutes defining private security guards encompass the vast majority of the private police
industry. See Rushin, supra note 35, at 186.
144
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only apply to private police officers primarily employed by a private police
company—they do not apply to private police officers employed directly by
a retail establishment, shopping mall, or other non-police business.147 They
also do not apply to off-duty public police officers employed by a private
company.148 These licensing requirements apply throughout the state;
political subdivisions such as cities and counties are prohibited from
enacting independent regulations on private police officers or companies.149
Performing the functions of a private police officer without a license or
violating the restrictions outlined below is a gross misdemeanor.150
To receive a license as an unarmed private police officer, an applicant
must be at least eighteen years of age, be a citizen of the United States or a
resident alien, be employed by a licensed private security company, pay a
fee, and complete an application.151 An applicant must complete sixteen
hours of training, though this may be reduced to eight if the applicant was
recently employed full-time as a sworn peace officer.152 Additionally, past
military training or experience satisfies the training requirements.153 All
employees must undergo four hours of annual refresher training.154
Applicants must also provide fingerprints and undergo a state-level
147

WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.020 (2015). This provision also provides that an
employee engaged in marijuana-related transportation or delivery services on behalf of a
common carrier must be licensed as an armed private security guard under this chapter in
order to be authorized to carry or use a firearm while providing such services.
148
Id.
149
Political subdivisions are permitted only to enact general business taxes and rules that
apply to all businesses, not just private security companies. WASH. REV. CODE §
18.170.140 (1991).
150
WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.160 (1995).
151
WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.030 (2012).
152
WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.105 (2007).
153
WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.310 (2011). The statute provides an exception to this rule
if the Director of the Department of Licensing determines that the military training or
experience is not “substantially equivalent to the standards of this state.” Id. However, the
statute contains no requirement that the applicant be in good standing with the military; it
appears that somebody who had been dishonorably discharged from military service may
nonetheless be exempt from the training requirement.
154
WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.105 (2007).

VOLUME 16 • ISSUE 2 • 2017

583

584 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

background check.155 If the applicant has committed a crime in another
jurisdiction, the Director of the Department of Licensing (Director) may
withhold the license upon a determination that the particular crime directly
relates to the applicant’s capacity to perform the duties of a public police
officer and that the license should be withheld to protect citizens of
Washington State.156 The authority to withhold a license is discretionary;
there is no requirement to do so.157
There are additional requirements for armed private police. They must be
at least twenty-one years old and must have a current firearms certificate
from the Criminal Justice Training Commission.158 In addition to the state
background check, they must submit to a national criminal history records
check.159
To receive a license to operate a private security company, an applicant
must meet the requirements to obtain a license as a private police officer
and be at least twenty-one years of age.160 Owning or operating a private
security company without a license is a gross misdemeanor.161 An owner of
a private security company must have at least three years’ experience as a
manager, supervisor, or administrator in the private security field or a
related field.162 Private security companies are required to maintain general
liability insurance coverage of at least $25,000 for bodily or personal injury
and $25,000 for property damage.163 These companies are also required to
notify the Director and/or local law enforcement in the event of: the death
or termination of a licensed private security guard; the company receiving
155

WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.130(2) (1995).
WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.030(3) (2012).
157
See id.
158
WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.040 (1991). To receive this certificate, an applicant must
undergo at least eight hours of training. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.101.260 (1991).
159
WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.130(2) (1995).
160
WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.060 (1995).
161
WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.160(2) (1995).
162
WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.060(1) (1995).
163
WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.080 (1991).
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information that would affect a licensed private police officer’s continuing
eligibility to hold a license; and any discharge of a firearm, outside of a
shooting range, by an officer while on duty.164 Private police companies are
also barred from using any name, sign, shield, marking, accessory, or
insignia that indicate that the individual, business, or equipment are part of
a public law enforcement agency.165
The licensing regulations authorize the Director to issue punishment to
licensed private police for unprofessional conduct.166 Punishments can
include the revocation of the license, remedial training, or “[o]ther
corrective action.”167 However, the disciplinary authority is purely at the
discretion of the Director, and the Director has the authority to stay any
action taken.168 Since 2007, none of the 11,000 licensed private police
officers in Washington have been disciplined by the state for misconduct or
excessive use of force.169
4. Lawsuits by Pr ivate Citizens ar e an Insufficient Check on the
Behavior of Pr ivate Police
Current tort remedies are an insufficient check on abuses by the private
police. While a tort action may succeed in case of serious physical injury or
property damage, tort actions will not succeed in regulating the day-to-day
operations of the private police.170 First, because the damages in these cases

164
Notification of a death or termination must be given to the Director within 30 days of
the event. Notification of an event affecting a guard’s continuing eligibility to hold a
license must be given immediately to the chief local law enforcement officer.
Notification of any discharge of a firearm must be given to local law enforcement within
10 days. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.110 (2000).
165
WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.160(6)–(7) (1995).
166
WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.230 (1995).
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Herz, supra note 19 (as of 2014).
170
See Rushin, supra note 35, at 197; Joh, supra note 3, at 126.
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are low, they are rarely brought.171 Second, even when a person has been
harmed, success in a lawsuit is not guaranteed.172 Third, many people do not
have the financial resources or knowledge required to pursue a civil suit
against a private police company or its client.173 As “repeat players” in the
legal system, private police companies have an advantage over less
experienced litigants, and may even see the expense of litigating and
settling claims as a cost of doing business.174 Fourth, the actions of private
police may be immunized from civil suit by a “shopkeeper’s privilege.”175
Finally, whereas an illegal search by public police may result in the
suppression of improperly-obtained evidence,176 a civil suit against the
private police will never overturn a criminal conviction, no matter how
egregious the behavior of the private police.

IV. THE WASHINGTON LEGISLATURE SHOULD ENACT LEGISLATION
IMPROVING REGULATION OF THE PRIVATE POLICE
The Washington State Legislature should improve the regulation of
private police companies in order to ensure that private police do not
infringe on the rights of Washington residents. Specifically, the legislature
should enact a new law that reforms the existing licensing statute so that it
adequately regulates the private police. First, the existing law should be
modified so that it covers all private police in the state and allows
171

Sharon Finegan, Watching the Watchers: The Growing Privatization of Criminal Law
Enforcement and the Need for Limits on Neighborhood Watch Associations, 8 U. MASS.
L. REV. 88, 128 (2013); Joh, supra note 3, at 109.
172
See, e.g., Shabazz v. Tecton Corp., No 27572-4-II, 2003 WL 734527 (Wash. Ct. App.
March 4, 2003) (finding no liability for apartment management company for hiring
unlicensed security guard who pepper-sprayed apartment resident and his guests);
Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1185–86.
173
Finegan, supra note 171, at 128; Rushin, supra note 35, at 197.
174
Rushin, supra note 35, at 197.
175
See, e.g., Guijosa v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 6 P.3d 583 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (holding
that WASH. REV. CODE 4.24.220 provides liability from civil suit if store security has
“reasonable grounds” to detain a suspected shoplifter and any detention is done for a
“reasonable time”); Joh, supra note 3, at 109.
176
Finegan, supra note 171, at 128.
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jurisdictions to enact their own supplemental reforms. Second, it should
require increased transparency into the actions of the private police. Third,
it should require private police to undergo more thorough training. Fourth, it
should make it easier for people who have been harmed by private police to
seek redress.
The Washington State Legislature has broad authority to enact the
suggested reform legislation. “[T]he power of the legislature to enact all
reasonable laws is unrestrained except where, either expressly or by fair
inference, it is prohibited by the state and Federal constitutions.”177 The
proposed reforms could be accomplished by amending the existing
licensing statutes for private police, which were initially enacted in 1991.178
Given the pervasive use of licensing statutes to regulate businesses in
Washington,179 it is likely that the proposed reforms would be within the
legislature’s constitutional authority.180
While drafting specific legislative language is outside of the scope of this
article, the legislation must be specific and precise in order to ensure
maximum effectiveness. Regulations that are vague create room for
inconsistent implementation by the organizations they regulate.181 Because
private police are motivated by profit, they are likely to interpret ambiguous
regulations in a way that maximizes profit, not public safety.182 They may

177
Clark v. Dwyer, 353 P.2d 941, 945 (Wash. 1960) (the decision further nots that, when
a statute’s validity is challenged, it is presumed constitutional and that “[w]here possible,
it will be presumed that the legislature has affirmatively determined any special facts
requisite to the validity of the enactment, even though no legislative finding of fact
appears in the statute.”).
178
S.B. 5124, 52nd Leg., 1991 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1991).
179
WASH. REV. CODE Title 18 contains licensing statutes for 93 different types of
businesses or professions.
180
See also WASH. CONST. art II, § 35. (“The legislature shall pass necessary laws for the
protection of persons working in . . . employments dangerous to life or deleterious to
health.”).
181
Rushin, supra note 35, at 198–99.
182
Id. at 199.
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even attempt to evade regulation in order to better serve their clients.183 In
contrast, due to their need to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the public
and the various oversight regimes they are subject to, public police may
have a stronger incentive to adhere to the spirit of ambiguous statutes.184
This section will identify four proposed legislative reforms: first,
modifying existing regulations to cover all private police and allow local
flexibility; second, promoting transparency of private police operations;
third, requiring more rigorous training for private police officers; and
fourth, improving access to remedies for citizens harmed by private police.
This section will close by addressing potential criticisms of the proposed
reforms and noting shortcomings in alternative reform proposals.
A. Expand the Scope of Existing Regulations and Allow Local Flexibility
The legislature should modify the existing regulations to ensure that the
licensing statutes cover all private police in the state while ensuring that
local jurisdictions have the flexibility to implement additional regulations as
they need. Specifically, the legislature should expand the law to cover all
private police, whether they are employed by a private police company or
by some other type of business, and should allow cities and counties to
implement their own supplemental regulations.
First, the legislature should expand the scope of the regulations to cover
all private police forces. Currently, the state licensing requirements only
apply to “third-party”185 private police—companies whose primary function
is providing private policing.186 They do not apply to “internalized” private
police—officers employed by a company, such as a shopping mall or retail
establishment, that is not focused on providing private policing or security
183
See id. at 170–71 (arguing that private police companies, to a greater degree than the
public police, are driven by profit maximization and client service).
184
See, e.g., id. at 174; Joh, supra note 3, at 65–66.
185
The distinction between “internalized” and “third-party” private police was adopted
from Rushin, supra note 35, at 166.
186
WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.020(1) (2015).
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services but nonetheless employs private police to patrol the business or
detain shoplifters.187 Broadening the scope of the regulation has two
primary benefits. First, for the reasons outlined above, improving regulation
of the private police industry as a whole is necessary to prevent abuses.
Because internalized private police are more likely to make arrests, conduct
searches, and carry weapons than third party private police,188 they should
not be exempt from regulation. Second, preserving an exemption for
internalized private police undermines the reforms outlined above. A
customer seeking to skirt regulations could simply develop an internalized
private police force rather than contracting with a third-party firm. Because
companies with significant resources to develop internalized private police
forces, such as shopping malls or large retail establishments, are likely to
receive a high number of customers, this loophole has the potential to affect
a large swath of the public.189
Second, the legislature should allow cities and counties to implement
their own supplemental regulations on private police conduct.190 Currently,
local governments are prohibited from creating independent regulations on
the conduct of private police.191 Permitting local governments to design and
implement their own regulations to supplement the state regulations will be
beneficial. For example, a jurisdiction may require additional training hours
or may require training about a subject of local concern. Another may
regulate what types of weapons private police can carry. An area with a

187

Id.
Rushin, supra note 35, at 178–80.
189
See also Abuses Against Workers Taint U.S. Meat and Poultry, HUMAN RIGHTS
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substantial Spanish-speaking population may require private police who
carry guns to have enough familiarity with the language that they can
interact safely with all residents. Successful regulations can serve as a
model that other jurisdictions can choose to adopt in the future.192
Additionally, preserving local flexibility will allow private police
companies to best meet the needs of their customers and allow localities to
best meet the needs of their residents. For example, a shopping mall in
Spokane, a vineyard in Walla Walla, and a private marina in Seattle may
have substantially different needs. Allowing local regulation may encourage
jurisdictions to enact innovative regulations that can enhance public safety
and serve as a model for others.
B. Improve Transparency in the Private Police Industry
The legislature should increase the transparency requirements for private
police companies so that policymakers and the public have a better
understanding of the ways in which private police operate. Over the last
several decades, observers of the criminal justice system have come to
understand the importance of collecting information on the practices of the
public police.193 The result has been a wealth of data and both empirical and
theoretical literature, which has helped guide efforts to reform public police
practices.194 However, similar efforts have not been made with respect to
the private police, and there is comparatively little knowledge about the
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See Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1168. (Noting that the decentralized regulatory structure
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regulation. For example, a jurisdiction may recognize a “right to police protection” and
increase public police funding in order to eliminate the market for private police. See id.
at 1170. Other possible avenues of private police reform include applying the
exclusionary rule to improper searches conducted by the private police or further
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activities of the private police.195 Increasing the amount of publiclyavailable information about the practices of private police will help guide
future regulatory or reform efforts. Specifically, private police companies
should be required to provide public reporting regarding their interactions
with citizens, private police contracts should be open to public scrutiny, and
the legislature should fund empirical field studies of private police.
Due to the secrecy of the private police industry, this information will
likely not be made public voluntarily.196 Because private police firms are
paid by their clients, and not by the public, they may be hesitant to report
abuses for fear of losing business.197 Thus, legislative action is the only sure
avenue to increased transparency in the private police industry. Specifically,
the legislature should (1) require private police to produce publicly
available reports about their interactions with citizens and to immediately
report a use of force or discharge of a firearm to the public police,
(2) facilitate transparency into private police contracts so the public knows
who is paying the private police and what they are paid to do, and (3) fund
empirical studies of the practices of the private police.
1. Impr ove Repor ting Requir ements
Private police companies should be required to produce regular, public
reports about their interactions with citizens and their uses of force.
Currently, private police companies in Washington are only required to
produce publicly-available reports in the case of the death or termination of
private police officers, events that would disqualify a private police officer
from holding a license, or a discharge of a firearm while on duty and
outside of a shooting range.198 Private police companies should also be
required to produce regular, publicly available reports on the number of
195
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people accosted or detained, when and how they were questioned, how
many suspects were turned over to the public police, the number and type of
searches conducted, and the circumstances and results of those searches.
They should also be required to report on how often they use force and what
sort of contact or weapon is used, and should be required to report on the
race, gender, age, and other salient characteristics of the person accosted. 199
Additionally, the legislature should tighten the existing reporting
deadlines by requiring immediate reporting of any use of force or of a
weapon. “Shooting incidents involving private police are underreported and
under-investigated relative to those involving public police.”200 Currently, a
private police company can wait up to 10 days before notifying local law
enforcement of a discharge of a firearm by a private police officer.201 There
is no requirement to report any other use of force by a private police officer.
Private police companies should be required to immediately report any
discharge of a firearm or use of force by a private police officer to local law
enforcement.202
2. Pr omote Contr act Tr anspar ency
Private police contracts should be subject to increased public scrutiny.203
Because private police companies are paid by their clients, and not by the
public, they have a powerful incentive to serve those clients at the expense
199
While these reports should be publicly available, they should take legitimate privacy
interests into account. Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1279.
200
Etzioni, supra note 22, at 298.
201
WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.110 (2000).
202
Depending on the frequency of private police officers’ use of force, the legislature
may want to consider mandating some sort of review of such incidents. For example, the
legislature could task the local bodies that review public police use of force incidents to
review private police incidents as well.
203
Unlimited public access to private police contracts would likely raise valid privacy
and business secrets concerns, so some redactions will likely be necessary. However, at a
minimum, private police companies should be obligated to disclose who they are working
for and any provisions relating to working with public police or enforcing the criminal
law.
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of the public.204 Private police companies should be required to disclose
who their clients are and what services they are asked to perform. Are they
instructed to remain unarmed or to carry weapons? What weapons do their
contracts allow them to carry? Will they use any surveillance equipment,
such as private drug-sniffing dogs? Are they obligated to report criminal
activity to the police or are they instructed to take some sort of action to
resolve it without involving the police? Are there any performance
requirements, such as number of people stopped or number of reports to the
public police, that officers are expected to meet?
Transparency into who is paying the private police and what the private
police are being paid to do will allow the public to better understand the
costs imposed by private policing. The private police have powerful
incentives to serve their clients, even if it comes at the expense of the
public. To enable effective governance of the private police, the public
should know what the private police are being paid to do it and who is
paying them.
Transparency into private police contracts may also deter inappropriate
private police behavior. One private police firm has maintained quotas that
its officers are expected to meet.205 A requirement that officers stop,
question, or detain a certain number of citizens may encourage private
police to target vulnerable members of society who are unable or unwilling
to resist. There is evidence that people hire private police to target racial
minorities in their communities.206
3. Fund Empir ical Studies
Finally, the legislature should fund empirical field studies of the private
police to develop a more nuanced understanding of their practices and to
204
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ensure that legal reforms result in changes in private police behavior.207 Due
to the lack of federal or constitutional constraints on private police, private
criminal procedure differs significantly from public criminal procedure.208
Because front-line officers in the field wield a significant amount of
discretion, studying internal processes and regulations is an inadequate
substitute for monitoring behavior in the field.209 A detailed field study of
the actual practices used by private police will help illustrate whether the
proposed reforms are succeeding and will also illuminate further
opportunities for reform.210
C. Require More Rigorous Training
The legislature should require that private police training is adequate to
protect both the public and officers themselves. Due to the high turnover
rates in the private police industry,211 proper training for new employees is
particularly important. However, due to these high turnover rates, private
police companies are hesitant to invest in training an employee who may
only be around a short time.212 Currently, Washington requires no more
than 16 hours of preliminary training and four hours of annual refresher
training.213 While most states require just over eight hours of preemployment training on average, Washington lags significantly behind
several states.214 California, Alaska, and Florida mandate forty hours of
training before licensing.215 Other states, including Georgia, Illinois,
Oklahoma, and Texas require twenty to thirty hours of pre-licensing
207
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training.216 Washington should, at a minimum, increase its training
requirements to forty hours to keep pace with the states that are leading in
this area and ensure that private police are trained in de-escalating conflicts
and avoiding use of force.217
Furthermore, the existing regulations contain only sparse details on what
kind of training is required.218 In contrast, improved training of public
police officers over the past several decades has resulted in increased
professionalism and compliance with the law.219 Private police should be
required to undergo training relating to use of force and de-escalation.220
Private security guards have attributed excessive use of force against
homeless people to inadequate training in interacting with those
populations.221 Additionally, training in implicit racial and other bias may
help reduce disparate treatment of vulnerable populations.222
One of the primary benefits of increasing the transparency of private
police practices is to illuminate areas where additional training is needed.
However, the above suggestions are preliminary changes that the legislature
can enact while additional information is gathered.
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D. Improve Access to Remedies for People Harmed by Private Police
The legislature should increase access to civil remedies to ensure that any
person harmed by private police is able to receive adequate redress. While
federal law provides a remedy for civil rights violations by the public
police, no such remedy is available with respect to abuses by the private
police.223 Furthermore, because interactions with the private police rarely
result in arrest, courts rarely have a reason to review their practices.224 The
legislature should create a civil right of action for people who are harmed
by private police forces, guarantee minimum damages for plaintiffs who can
show violations of constitutional norms, and increase the minimum
insurance requirements for private police companies.
The legislature should provide citizens with a right of action against
private police for wrongful search, seizure, or use of force. People should be
able to exercise this right of action in a forum, such as an administrative
hearing, that is cheaper and more accessible to the general public than
traditional civil litigation.225 While the high costs associated with civil
litigation can deter citizens from assuring their rights, a cheaper option such
as an administrative hearing will encourage aggrieved citizens to come
forward.226
Additionally, the legislature should impose minimum statutory damages
for constitutional violations by private police, particularly those that result
in a criminal conviction.227 If a plaintiff can show that a private police
officer has done something that the state or federal constitutions bar a
public police officer from doing, the law should set a minimum dollar figure
the plaintiff is entitled to recover. The minimum recovery should be higher
223
See Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1186–87 (noting that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows
plaintiffs to recover damages and attorneys’ fees, generally does not apply to suits against
the private police).
224
See Joh, supra note 3, at 92.
225
Rushin, supra note 35, at 198.
226
Id.
227
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if the violation results in a criminal conviction. Because the monetary cost
of a constitutional violation, alone, is difficult to quantify, statutory
minimum damages will likely facilitate civil suits because they will make a
potential recovery more predictable.
To ensure that private police companies have adequate resources to
compensate anybody harmed, the legislature should raise the minimum
level of insurance coverage that private police companies are required to
hold. If, as it stands currently, a civil tort action is the primary vehicle by
which an individual harmed by private police will receive redress, the
insurance requirements must be high enough to cover any possible liability.
The information currently available suggests that the existing
requirements are much too low. Washington law requires private police
companies to hold only $50,000 total general liability coverage.228 In
contrast, to receive a permit for a public fireworks display, an applicant
must have at least $75,000 of insurance coverage for each event.229 A
fishing guide must hold $300,000 of coverage.230 As private policing—and
particularly armed private policing—may pose a risk to public safety,
private police companies should be required to hold equivalent amounts of
insurance coverage.231
Washington’s requirement is inadequate to ensure compensation for
people harmed by private police, particularly if there are serious injuries.
After the Westlake Center pepper spray incident, the victim’s attorney
estimated the potential damages at $450,000.232 In another incident, the
actions of an off-duty public police officer working as a private police
228
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officer resulted in the death of a minor and total liability of over $1.5
million.233 Collecting information on private police practices, particularly
use of force, will enable the legislature to determine the appropriate level of
insurance coverage to ensure that any person harmed by a private police
company is able to receive appropriate compensation.
Creating a right of action in an administrative forum, guaranteeing
minimum damages for Constitutional violations, and requiring more robust
insurance coverage will facilitate civil suits against the private police when
they violate peoples’ rights. Such legal action will help prevent
inappropriate private police behavior. Because private police companies are
motivated by profit, the risk of monetary penalties creates a strong incentive
to prevent abuses by private police.
E. Responses to Criticisms
The legislative reforms proposed will likely attract opposition,
particularly from private police companies and from private police
customers who fear increased prices or lower-quality service. The following
section will address four possible criticisms: (1) the reforms are
unnecessary because the private police can regulate themselves, (2) the
reforms are unnecessary because the threat of criminal prosecution will
deter misconduct, (3) the reforms will undermine the viability of the private
police industry, and (4) without private police services, people may turn to
vigilante activity. This section will conclude by addressing a common
competing reform proposal: treating private police as state actors.
1. State Regulation is Necessar y; Voluntar y Self-Regulation by the
Pr ivate Police Industr y is Inadequate
Private police companies will likely argue that this proposal is
unnecessary because they can adequately regulate themselves without
government interference. They will point to studies sponsored by the
233
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Department of Justice that have recommended that private police firms
adopt and enforce voluntary guidelines.234 British private police companies
have implemented “industry-imposed” regulations.235 Critics will argue that
the profit motive and the need to provide quality service to customers will
ensure that private police officers are well-trained, their backgrounds are
checked, and they perform their jobs safely. Furthermore, because their
actions can expose their clients to liability, the private police will have a
financial incentive to avoid any abusive behavior.236
However, voluntary codes of conduct and the profit motive alone will not
ensure adequate regulation of the private police; new legislation is needed
to govern the conduct of private police. The examples of private police
abuses identified earlier in the article provide evidence that private police
companies are unable to adequately regulate their conduct. Furthermore,
studies of the British regulatory scheme, which has been touted as a model
for American companies to emulate, showed it to be entirely ineffective.237
Information disclosures, such as those suggested above, would be
necessary to verify the success of any scheme of self-regulation.
Furthermore, price competition among private police firms creates a
powerful incentive to reduce expenses on things like wages, training, and
background checks.238 An effective scheme of self-regulation would require
universal cooperation and a willingness to embrace higher prices or lower
profits, both of which seem unlikely. Self-regulation is likely to be, at best,
a supplement to regulation by the state.239
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2. The Thr eat of Cr iminal Pr osecution Will Not Pr event Pr ivate Police
Misconduct
Private police companies might also argue that legislation is unnecessary
because the threat of criminal prosecution will deter the private police from
harming people. However, the risk that abusive conduct will result in a
criminal prosecution is an insufficient check on the actions of private
police. The story of the private police officer in Part I, supra, provides
anecdotal evidence of this. When the officer’s felony conviction prevented
him from seeking employment, he convinced a court to vacate it and
received his license as a private police officer three years later.240 He was
hired as a private police officer, despite a criminal record showing negligent
driving, unlawful discharge of a firearm, violation of a no-contact order,
and forgery.241 The officer’s 2014 arrest and charges of fourth-degree
assault for pepper-spraying two teenagers, while employed at a different
private police firm, did not prevent CP from hiring him.242 In Washington,
not a single private police officer has been disciplined by the state
Department of Licensing since 2007.243
One observer has noted that, empirically, criminal prosecutions of the
private police “appear virtually nonexistent,”244 but the proposed reforms
may encourage prosecution for abuses by the private police. Because
private police interactions rarely result in arrest, courts are rarely able to
review the practices of the private police.245 Current Washington law
facilitates unpunished private police abuses: there is no requirement that
240
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private police companies report a use of force to law enforcement. Private
police companies have no incentive to expose themselves to liability by
doing so. Thus, it is likely that private police use of force will only be
investigated if a victim or third party reports it. However, victims and
bystanders may have an incentive not to report abuses if they have been
engaged in criminal activity or fear interacting with the public police. The
proposed legislation would require private police forces to immediately
report any discharge of a firearm or use of force. This requirement would
enable the public police to investigate these incidents before any evidence is
lost.
3. Legislation Will Not Under mine the Effectiveness of Pr ivate Police
Officer s or the Viability of the Pr ivate Police Industr y
Private police companies and their supporters may argue that the
recommended legislation will impede the effectiveness of private police and
may threaten the viability of the private police industry. A group of Seattle
residents noted that one of the benefits of the private police is that they are
willing to “perform many tasks that would be considered ‘beneath’ most
beat cops.”246 In this view, the lax regulatory environment that private
police operate in is essential, as it enables them to respond to events more
flexibly than the public police.
However, improving regulation of the private police will not undermine
their effectiveness and may help the industry better serve its customers.247
Improved training requirements will make the private police better at their
jobs. Some private police have reported feeling “unprepared and anxious
246
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about how they would handle certain situations if they arose.”248 Other
private police have reported they do not receive self-defense training they
need to protect themselves.249 While the country’s largest membership
group for private police, the International Foundation for Protection
Officers, has recommended increased training standards, no state comes
close to meeting the recommendations.250 Private police personnel have said
that the lack of training results in excessive use of force.251 Thus, improving
the training that private police receive will help protect both the public and
the private police officers themselves.
4. Impr oving Regulation of Pr ivate Police Will Not Pr ovoke a Backlash
by Vigilante Gr oups
Opponents of the proposed reforms may argue that it will make the
public less safe by spurring vigilante movements. If the private police are
no longer able to provide the aggressive tactics that residents want,
residents may take matters into their own hands. Because vigilante groups
are entirely untrained and unregulated, they may be more likely to infringe
peoples’ rights or injure people. Fears of a citizen backlash are not
unfounded; when a California state court held that the exclusionary rule
applied to the private police, the decision was overturned by a state
referendum.252 In Seattle, there have been complaints of vigilante groups
with dogs intimidating residents of the Columbia City neighborhood.253
248
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However, the risks posed by private police are greater than those posed
by vigilante groups. Even though they have the same legal authority as
ordinary people, private police are “occupationally disposed to use powers
that a citizen may rarely, if ever, invoke.”254
In addition, private police are more likely than vigilante groups to be
mistaken for public police. Private police uniforms are frequently designed
to mimic those of the public police.255 This similarity causes confusion
because an observer may mistakenly believe that a private police officer is
actually a public police officer vested with legal authority.256 This confusion
increases the risk of infringing on peoples’ rights; people may mistakenly
believe that they are legally obligated to submit to a search or detention by
private police. In contrast, citizen patrols or vigilante groups are unlikely to
be perceived as possessing legal authority because they do not wear officiallooking uniforms.
Finally, existing state law likely prohibits the formation of vigilante
groups. It is a gross misdemeanor for any person to perform the “functions
and duties” of a private police officer without a license.257
5. The Pr oposed Refor ms Ar e a Better Solution Than Expanding the
State Actor Doctr ine to Cover Pr ivate Police
Several observers have argued that private police should be treated as
state actors.258 If courts or legislatures were to classify the private police as
state actors, they would become subject to constitutional constraints, such
as the exclusionary rule and the requirement to provide Miranda warnings.
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This alternative strategy for improving the regulation of the private police
may make the proposed legislation unnecessary.
However, the legislative reforms advocated in this article are a superior
means of regulating the private police. Expanding the state actor doctrine
will not actually deter abuses by the private police. The primary
consequence259 of an illegal search or seizure by a state actor is that any
evidence obtained will be excluded from a criminal trial.260 This deters
public police from conducting illegal searches because it makes it more
difficult to obtain a criminal conviction. However, unlike the public police,
many private police are not concerned with enforcing the criminal law or
obtaining a criminal conviction.261 Thus, expanding the state actor doctrine
is unlikely to be a sufficient check on the behavior of private police.
Because they are motivated by profit, not criminal convictions, the
proposed legislative reforms are necessary to ensure that the public is
protected from abuses by the private police.

V. CONCLUSION
Lax regulation of the private police poses significant risks to public
safety and encourages private police to violate constitutional norms with
impunity. The stories of police abuses in Magnolia and at Westlake Center
Mall demonstrate that these fears are not merely hypothetical; interacting
with loosely-regulated private police places Washington residents at risk.
Existing regulations are inadequate to protect the public. Because they
are not state actors, the constraints that the U.S. Constitution places on the
public police do not apply to the private police. Thus, legal protections that
the general public may be familiar with—the prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures, Miranda warnings, or the exclusionary
259
Violating a person’s constitutional rights also subjects a state actor to a civil lawsuit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, these suits are often costly and difficult to bring,
making them an insufficient check on abusive behavior. See supra Part III.B.4.
260
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261
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rule—do not govern interactions with the private police. However, because
the private police’s dress and demeanor attempt to mimic that of the public
police, the public may not realize the difference. Though the private police
have no more legal authority than an ordinary person, the public may
mistakenly believe they act with state authority. An individual who submits
to a search or interrogation by a private police officer may see the evidence
gathered passed along to the public police. This may result in a criminal
conviction, even if the exact same search would have been illegal if
conducted by the public police.
Washington’s current regulatory structure is inadequate to combat this
problem. Washington courts do not consider the private police to be state
actors; thus, the behavior of the private police is not constrained by the state
or federal constitution. Washington’s licensing scheme, which serves as the
primary source of regulatory authority, must be improved. It exempts
private police who do not work for a private police company from its
requirements and it prohibits local jurisdictions from enacting additional
regulations to protect their residents. The legislature must enact new
legislation to improve regulation of the private police. These reforms should
include improving transparency in the private police industry, improving
training requirements for private police, and facilitating redress for people
who are harmed by private police.
These reforms will help protect the public from abuses by private police.
The requirement to immediately report a use of force or discharge of a
firearm will enable the public police to investigate abusive private police
behavior. Transparency into the private police industry will enable future
policymakers to design additional appropriate regulations. Improved
training will enable the private police to interact safely with the public. If,
despite these reforms, an individual is harmed by inappropriate private
police conduct, improved access to remedies will help them receive
appropriate redress. Finally, these reforms will help ensure the integrity of
efforts to reform the public police, such as the City of Seattle’s consent
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decree with the Department of Justice, by preventing abusive tactics from
simply migrating from the public to the private police. The proposed
legislation will enable the private police to serve their clients’ needs while
maintaining public safety and strengthening constitutional norms.
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